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ABSTRACT 
Some of the most controversial litigation arising out of the War on 
Terror has involved petitions for writs of habeas corpus. In its 2008 
decision, Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court established that 
detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, had the constitutional right to 
habeas review. In applying Boumediene, however, the Court of Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit held in Al Maqaleh v. Gates that habeas rights did 
not extend to detainees at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan. 
This article argues that because certain constitutional rights, namely 
civil rights, push back against powers granted to the government, these 
rights should be available to any person who is subject to those powers. 
Because civil rights counterbalance the use of government force, they 
must always be made available to individuals who are subject to that 
force, regardless of their nationality or location. 
As applied to the detainees in Afghanistan, this theory requires that 
access to the habeas writ be available to all military detainees not 
designated as prisoners of war. The Constitution establishes the habeas 
writ as the appropriate vehicle for challenges to detention by the 
Executive. Therefore, this remedy should be available to all military 
detainees without consideration of nationality or site of detention. 
 
* Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2012; Swarthmore College, B.A. 2007. This 
paper originated from a course on National Security Law taught by Professor Scott L. Silliman 
and Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr. (U.S.A.F., Retired). I would like to thank Christopher 
Berg and Kara Duffle, whose insight into these questions helped refine my own thinking, as well 
as Siobhan Innes-Gawn and the staff of the Duke Journal of Constitutional Law and Public 
Policy for their help throughout the editorial process. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The law abhors a vacuum. Those in positions of governmental 
authority act according to dictates of the law, and their actions often 
modify or create legal rights. The government cannot prosecute 
without thereby giving rights to the accused;1 it cannot seize property 
without giving rights to the former owner.2 Most importantly, since 
the time of the Magna Carta, it cannot detain individuals without 
giving them the right to challenge the basis for their detention.3 The 
judicial writ of habeas corpus has long provided the basic remedy for 
those seeking to challenge their detention by the sovereign or the 
executive.4 
Although the habeas writ obtains in the detained individual, it 
originated as a vehicle by which the judiciary checked the power of 
the executive.5 As such, it is an example of the kind of rights this 
article will term civil rights—those that function as counterweights 
against the exercise of power by the government.6 The government 
cannot act against individuals without civil rights rushing in to fill the 
void created by that action. This conception of civil rights includes the 
conventional understanding: for example, the right to equal protection 
that underlies anti-discrimination laws7 arises after government action 
favors one party over another similarly situated party. It is prior 
government action that activates rights as varied as equal protection, 
the right to counsel, and habeas corpus. This not only provides a 
unifying feature to these rights but also reveals to whom they should 
be made available. As the products of government power, civil rights 
should extend as far as the force of that power may be projected. 
 
 
 1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (establishing the right to counsel). 
 2. See id. amend. V (precluding the taking of private property without “just 
compensation”). 
 3. MAGNA CARTA, June 15, 1215, ¶ 29 (Eng.) (“No freeman is to be taken or imprisoned 
or disseised of his free tenement or of his liberties or free customs, or outlawed or exiled or in 
any way ruined, nor will we go against such a man or send against him save by lawful judgement 
of his peers or by the law of the land.”), available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured 
_documents/magna_carta/translation.html. 
 4. 9 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 112 (1926). 
 5. See Paul D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause: English Text, 
Imperial Contexts, and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575, 586 (2008) (arguing that 
“conceptually the writ arose from a theory of power rather than a theory of liberty”). 
 6. See infra Part IV.A. 
 7. See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (“Such an opportunity, where the 
state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms.” 
(emphasis added)). 
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Although the authors of the Magna Carta scarcely could imagine 
the system of extraterritorial detention that is now available to the 
President of the United States, contemporary American courts have 
revisited the history of the habeas writ in light of the defining features 
of the War on Terror.8 Most recently, in Boumediene v. Bush, the 
Supreme Court determined that the privilege of the habeas writ 
extends to at least some foreign nationals detained abroad9—those 
who arguably are at the farthest reaches of whom the Constitution 
protects. Lower courts interpreting the Boumediene decision in cases 
like Al Maqaleh v. Gates,10 which involved habeas petitions from 
foreign nationals detained at the U.S. Air Force Base in Bagram, 
Afghanistan, have only begun to test exactly how far afield the 
Court’s decision will reach. 
To assist in answering that question, this article argues that the 
writ of habeas corpus acts as a push back against the detention power 
of the Executive and that, as such, it inheres in any individual subject 
to detention by the Executive—regardless of their nationality or site 
of detention. Unlike rights that inhere on the basis of citizenship11 or 
presence in the nation’s territory,12 the civil rights discussed here—
including the right to habeas—are created by the government’s 
decision to take action and nothing more. 
This article will develop this conception of civil rights as 
countervailing forces to constitutional grants of government power 
using the writ of habeas corpus as a guiding example. Part II will 
discuss the historical law governing habeas, followed in Part III by a 
discussion of the Al Maqaleh decisions at the District and Circuit 
Court levels as examples of the application of contemporary law to 
civil rights questions. Part IV will develop a general theory of civil 
rights, providing both historical and structural arguments. This part 
then will apply the framework to the question of the extraterritorial 
availability of the habeas writ, concluding that the writ should be 
made available to those who are under the control of the Executive 
 
 8. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 739–43 (2008) (discussing the historical 
development of the habeas writ out of English law). 
 9. Id. at 795–98. 
 10. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 11. See, e.g., Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 672 (1978) (noting 
that the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment are “every citizen’s federal right”). 
 12. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (discussing how private international 
law governs “the rights of persons within the territory and dominion of one nation, by reason of 
acts, private or public, done within the dominions of another nation”). 
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and who have no alternative means to challenge their detention. Part 
V will apply this theory to the facts and circumstances of the Al 
Maqaleh decision, discussing how courts should apply this conception 
of habeas. 
II.  CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIAL  
HABEAS RIGHTS 
The writ of habeas corpus, formally known as habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum (which loosely translates to “you should produce the 
body to be subject to examination”) is one of the most fundamental 
and powerful checks on the power of the executive.13 A petition for a 
habeas writ is filed by a person who believes he is being wrongly held; 
if the petition is granted, the court issues a habeas writ directing the 
detaining official to produce the detainee before the court to 
challenge the validity of the detention.14 
The writ is specifically mentioned in Article One, Section Nine of 
the Constitution, which reads: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas 
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it.”15 Because the only mention 
of the suspension of habeas rights occurs during a discussion of 
congressional powers, the Supreme Court historically has held that 
Congress alone may suspend the writ; the President acting alone has 
no authority to do so.16 
A. Historical Approaches to the Habeas Writ in U.S. Constitutional 
Law 
Cases dealing with the right to habeas in America have arisen as 
far back as the Civil War.17 The relevant precedent governing the 
 
 13. See James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to 
Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1433, 1443–45 (2000) (detailing the development 
of writs as protections for the people against certain actions taken by the sovereign). 
 14. Gerald L. Neuman, Habeas Corpus, Executive Detention, and the Removal of Aliens, 98 
COLUM. L. REV. 961, 970–71 (1998). 
 15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 16. See Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (1861). Writing from a Circuit Court, Chief 
Justice Taney struck down President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas rights during the 
Civil War, id. at 148, an order that was expressly ignored by Lincoln, see Wayne McCormack, 
Emergency Powers and Terrorism, 185 MIL. L. REV. 69, 94 (2005). The Merryman opinion, 
which noted that no English king dared claim for himself the power Lincoln was arrogating, 
closed by arguing that “if the authority which the constitution has confided to the judiciary 
department . . . [may] be usurped by the military power . . . the people of the United States are 
no longer living under a government of laws.” Merryman, 17 F. Cas. at 152. 
 17. See, e.g., id. at 148 (holding that President Lincoln’s unilateral suspension of habeas 
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application of the writ outside of the territory of the United States did 
not arise, however, until after World War II. In Johnson v. 
Eisentrager,18 the Court held that German nationals imprisoned by the 
United States Army in the aftermath of the war did not have the right 
to habeas proceedings to challenge the legality of their detention.19 
The decision in Eisentrager essentially limited the habeas writ to those 
who had been present within the “territorial jurisdiction” of a United 
States district court at some “stage of [their] captivity.”20 
Eisentrager remained largely untouched until the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, and the ensuing War on Terror brought habeas 
rights once again to the fore. Although the Court made steady 
progress toward clarifying the reach and force of the right to habeas 
during the first few years after the attacks,21 its decision in 
Boumediene v. Bush concluded—without overturning Eisentrager—
that the constitutional right to habeas corpus extended outside the 
sovereign territory of the United States.22 The petitioners in 
Boumediene were non-U.S. nationals held at Guantánamo after being 
designated enemy combatants by the Executive.23 They petitioned for 
habeas in the wake of a back-and-forth over detainees’ rights: the 
Court would allow a petition for reasons of statutory construction, 
and then Congress would seek to close the door by enacting new 
legislation.24 Boumediene ended the volleying by establishing a 




corpus during the Civil War was unconstitutional). 
 18. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 19. Id. at 790. 
 20. Id. at 768. 
 21. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478 (2004) (holding that the territorial jurisdiction 
requirement was not “an invariable prerequisite” of a district court’s jurisdiction to hear a 
habeas petition and allowing habeas proceedings by foreign nationals detained at Guantánamo 
Bay, Cuba (quoting Braden v. 30th Jud. Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973))). 
 22. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
 23. Id. at 732. 
 24. See id. at 734–35. The Court allowed statutory habeas petitions in Rasul v. Bush, 542 
U.S. 466 (2004), which was followed by Congress’s passage of the jurisdiction-stripping 
Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 (West 2005). The DTA was held 
inapplicable to most Guantánamo detainees in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). This 
prompted Congress to pass the more thoroughly jurisdiction-stripping Military Commissions 
Act (MCA), 10 U.S.C.A. § 948(a) (West 2007), thus leaving the Court with no choice but to 
confront the question of whether the Boumediene petitioners had a constitutional right to 
habeas when they applied for it after the passage of the MCA, Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 735. 
 25. Id. at 770. 
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Boumediene established a three-
prong test for the extraterritorial application of habeas rights.26 Courts 
are required to consider and balance: (1) the citizenship and status of 
the detainee, and the adequacy of the process by which that status was 
determined; (2) the nature of the sites of detention and apprehension; 
and (3) the “practical obstacles” that would make granting the writ 
problematic.27 Inherent in this test is the notion that habeas is not as 
limited a writ as it may have appeared after Eisentrager; its reach is 
flexible and will depend on circumstance rather than binary 
considerations of either citizenship or territoriality. A simple analysis 
of de jure sovereignty—determining which nation exercises technical 
control over the land in question—is not enough,28 nor will the 
citizenship of the detainee alone provide an answer.29 
III.  APPLYING BOUMEDIENE BEYOND GUANTÁNAMO:  
THE AL MAQALEH DECISIONS 
The flagship case testing whether the doctrine announced in 
Boumediene would apply outside the narrow confines of Guantánamo 
Bay is a set of four habeas petitions consolidated as Al Maqaleh v. 
Gates.30 Four individuals held at Bagram Air Force Base in 
Afghanistan petitioned for writs of habeas corpus.31 The district court 
granted three of the four petitions,32 but the D.C. Circuit reversed and 
dismissed all four cases.33 Despite coming to opposite conclusions, 
both courts looked to Boumediene as their touchstone when 
evaluating the petitions.34 Though no petition for certiorari was filed 
in the Supreme Court, it seems unlikely that Al Maqaleh will be the 
last word on the reach of Boumediene. 
 
 
 26. Id. at 766. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 764 (noting that de jure sovereignty analysis, while “a factor that bears upon 
which constitutional guarantees apply . . . has [never] been the only relevant consideration in 
determining the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas corpus”). 
 29. Id. at 770 (admitting that “before today the Court has never held that noncitizens 
detained by our Government in territory over which another country maintains de jure 
sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution,” yet concluding that “Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the 
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay”). 
 30. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009). 
 31. Id. at 207. 
 32. Id. at 235–36. 
 33. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 34. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 207–08; Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 94. 
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A. The District Court Decision in Al Maqaleh: Restraining the 
Executive 
The district court concluded that non-Afghan nationals detained 
for a considerable period at Bagram had a constitutional right to 
habeas review of their detention.35 The court explicitly contrasted 
Boumediene with Eisentrager, viewing those decisions as defining the 
poles of habeas jurisprudence.36 Because Bagram was comparable to 
Guantánamo in the degree of U.S. control, the court reasoned that 
non-Afghan nationals detained there should have access to the 
habeas writ.37 
To reach this conclusion, the district court broke down the 
Boumediene three-prong analysis into six factors: 
(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; 
(3) the adequacy of the process through which the status 
determination was made; (4) the nature of the site of 
apprehension; (5) the nature of the site of detention; and (6) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s 
entitlement to the writ.38 
This breakdown was an attempt to bring additional clarity to the 
three prongs of Boumediene by isolating them as completely as 
possible. Though the resulting six-factor analysis is frequently 
repetitive because of common underlying concerns, the court did 
correctly isolate what should be the dispositive questions: whether 
U.S. control of the detainees is exclusive and whether the detainees 
had adequate alternative remedies to challenge their detention.39 
Turning specifically to the six questions considered by the district 
court, it is clear that concern for the level of U.S. control and the 
existence of alternative remedies guided the analysis at each step. The 
court considered the first three factors in rapid succession: the 
citizenship of the detainee, the detainee’s status, and the site of 
 
 35. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231–32 (balancing the Boumediene factors with respect 
to each of the habeas petitioners). 
 36. See id. at 221 (“In assessing the objective degree of control, one question is whether 
Bagram is more like Guantanamo Bay, the site at issue in Boumediene, or like Landsberg Prison 
in post-World War II Germany, the site at issue in Eisentrager.”). 
 37. Id. at 232 (“It is worth repeating that the Bagram detainees in these cases are virtually 
identical to the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene, and the circumstances of their detention 
are quite similar as well.”). 
 38. Id. at 215. 
 39. See infra Part IV (discussing the importance of exclusive control and available remedies 
when considering the reach of the habeas writ). 
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apprehension.40 Here, as in Boumediene, the fact that the habeas 
petitioners were foreign citizens weighed against the availability of 
the writ.41 However, they were also classified by the U.S. government 
as enemy combatants—a category the government defined 
“broad[ly].”42 The district court emphasized that if the Executive is to 
use such a broad definition, there must be “a meaningful process to 
ensure that detainees are not improperly classified.”43 Importantly, 
this emphasis on process was reiterated throughout the opinion—the 
need for the availability of some remedy was a strong motivating 
factor in the court’s decision. 
The court’s consideration of the site of apprehension has nuanced 
and evinced a respect for the policy considerations underlying 
Boumediene. The court did not focus on the site of apprehension as an 
important factor for its own sake, but rather for what it represented: 
the possibility that the Executive could render individuals to various 
locations specifically to avoid the reach of the Constitution.44 The 
district court’s concern was that the checks and balances of the 
American system of government remain firmly in place. The 
worrisome “specter of limitless Executive power” required courts to 
ensure that the Executive cannot simply move individuals into a 
theater of war and thereby evade judicial review.45 Because the Al 
Maqaleh petitioners were captured outside of Afghanistan,46 the 
decision to bring them to Bagram for detention realized the 
Boumediene Court’s fears47—the Executive actively moved these 
detainees into a theater of war, where the arguments against granting 
habeas would be at their strongest.48 As such, this factor weighed in 
petitioners’ favor, unlike their foreign nationality and place of 
 
 40. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 217–18. 
 41. Id. at 219. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 219–20. 
 44. See id. at 220 (“Such rendition resurrects the same specter of limitless Executive power 
the Supreme Court sought to guard against in Boumediene—the concern that the Executive 
could move detainees physically beyond the reach of the Constitution and detain them 
indefinitely.”). 
 45. Id. 
 46. The Government contended that Al Maqaleh was captured in Afghanistan, but given 
the procedural posture of the case (a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction), the district court 
drew the factual inference in favor of the petitioner. See id. at 210, 221. 
 47. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765–66 (2008) (“The test for determining the 
scope of [the Suspension Clause] must not be subject to manipulation by those whose power it is 
designed to restrain.”). 
 48. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 221. 
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apprehension.49 
The court then turned to one of the more complicated, and 
ultimately dispositive, questions: the nature of the site of detention.50 
The relevant precedents offered mutually exclusive outcomes. 
Eisentrager counseled against habeas protection for enemy aliens 
detained at Landsberg Prison in post-World War II Germany;51 
Boumediene held that the constitutional right to habeas extended to 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba—without overruling Eisentrager.52 The 
district court’s interpretation of the relevant test from Boumediene—
the “objective degree of control”53 exercised by the United States—
took two factors into consideration: the degree and duration of U.S. 
control over Bagram.54 
The court concluded that Bagram was more analogous to 
Guantánamo than Landsberg. For example, the base at Bagram was 
similar to Guantánamo because the U.S. exercised “practically 
absolute” control over the Bagram facility, regardless of nominal 
Afghan sovereignty.55 Landsberg Prison, in contrast, was controlled 
jointly by the Allied Powers.56 Yet unlike the nearly indefinite 
character of the U.S. occupation of Guantánamo Bay, the Bagram 
leasehold was barely a decade old and there was no indication that 
the U.S. intended to retain the base well into the future.57 Thus, though 
Bagram did not “align squarely” with the facts of either Eisentrager or 
Boumediene, the district court concluded that the latter provided the 
closer analogy, favoring petitioners’ argument for habeas rights.58 
The district court concluded that the petitioners did not have 
adequate process, the next factor required by Boumediene.59 The 
Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Boards used to review the 
petitioners’ designation as enemy combatants afforded less protection 
than did the Combatant Status Review Tribunals used in 
 
 49. Id. 
 50. See id. at 221–26. 
 51. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766, 785 (1950). 
 52. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767–71. 
 53. Id. at 754. 
 54. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 221–22. 
 55. Id. at 223. The Court in Boumediene specifically rejected a test based solely on actual 
sovereignty. 553 U.S. at 755. 
 56. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 224. 
 57. Id. at 225. 
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 226–27. 
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Guantánamo and considered by the Boumediene Court.60 As such, this 
factor also favored petitioners.61 
The court finally turned to a consideration of the practical 
obstacles that would arise upon a grant of habeas. Though the 
Boumediene Court emphasized that its holding might have been 
different had the detainees been held in an “active theater of war,”62 
the district court in Al Maqaleh noted that even the Eisentrager 
prisoners—captured and tried in an active theater of war—received a 
more substantial opportunity to challenge their detention than did the 
Bagram petitioners.63 More importantly, however, none of the non-
Afghan detainees could possibly challenge their confinement before 
any other tribunal than the U.S. courts.64 
The court’s balancing of these factors turned primarily on the 
differences between the Bagram and Guantánamo petitioners.65 The 
court noted that in Bagram the U.S. had less objective control, 
petitioners had less adequate process to challenge their status, and 
potentially greater practical obstacles could be mitigated via 
technology.66 On balance, the court concluded that “the practical 
obstacles are not so substantial as to defeat [the non-Afghan 
detainees’] invocation of the Suspension Clause.”67 
The lack of alternate remedies and the fact that the U.S. exercised 
de facto exclusive control over the detainees’ confinement appeared 
to guide the court’s decision-making at each step. These concerns 
remained a primary focus of the analysis throughout and, importantly, 
provided the legal basis for denying habeas to one detainee, an 
Afghan national, who may have had an available remedy from his 
home government.68 For the others, detention at a U.S. military base 
 
 60. Id. at 227. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770 (noting that if the detainees had been held in an “active 
theater of war,” arguments against issuing the writ would have carried more weight). 
 63. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 228 (citing Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 766 
(1950)). 
 64. See id. at 230 (noting that the detainees “are not subject to transfer to Afghan custody, 
so the United States is ‘answerable to no other sovereign’ for their detention” (quoting 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 770)). The court noted that the one Afghan petitioner was affected 
differently by this practical factor—a difference that would ultimately lead to the denial of the 
habeas remedy in his particular case. Id. at 230–31, 235. 
 65. Id. at 231–32. 
 66. Id. at 231. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 230, 235 (denying the petition and noting that “[f]or Wazir [the Afghan national]  
. . . the United States may be answerable to Afghanistan to some degree”). 
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under exclusive U.S. control was held to be sufficient to establish 
constitutional access to habeas under Boumediene.69 
B. The D.C. Circuit Reverses: Restraining Boumediene 
Following the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss, the 
government immediately appealed to the D.C. Circuit after 
certification for interlocutory appeal.70 The circuit court applied a 
different interpretation of Boumediene and reversed the district court, 
dismissing all of the Bagram detainees’ habeas petitions.71 
Unlike the district court, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion contained an 
extensive review of the habeas jurisprudence applicable to persons 
held overseas, starting with Eisentrager and continuing through 
Boumediene.72 This history was more than a formality: the D.C. Circuit 
drew extensively on pre-Boumediene jurisprudence to justify its 
conclusion that habeas does not extend to Bagram. Indeed, the 
majority explained that its interpretive task was to apply “Eisentrager 
as construed and explained in the Court’s more recent opinion in 
Boumediene.”73 This alternate starting point—assuming that 
Eisentrager states the rule and Boumediene provides clarification—is 
the basis of the different outcomes at the district and circuit court 
levels. 
Despite this changed emphasis, the substance of the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion still begins with the three Boumediene factors.74 The court 
concluded that the first factor, citizenship and status of the detainee, 
was identical to that of the petitioners in Boumediene, and similarly 
weighed in petitioners’ favor.75 In addition, because the process by 
which the Bagram detainees were classified was weaker than the 
process used in both Eisentrager and Boumediene, the argument for 
habeas review was more compelling.76 
Turning to the second factor, the court concluded that the site of 
apprehension and detention “weigh[ed] heavily in favor of the United 
 
 69. See id. at 231 (balancing the Boumediene factors). 
 70. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 88–94. 
 73. Id. at 94. 
 74. The D.C. Circuit used the standard three-step Boumediene formulation, unlike the 
district court, which applied a six-factor analysis. Id. at 95–99. This article therefore uses the 
numerical terminology applied by each respective court when describing their opinions. 
 75. Id. at 96. 
 76. Id. 
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States.”77 Because the lease for Bagram Air Force Base is considerably 
more temporary than that of Guantánamo Bay, the degree of U.S. 
sovereignty, even on a de facto basis, is more limited than was the case 
in Boumediene.78 The court’s reasoning on the second point is fairly 
conclusory, though, in part because the D.C. Circuit did not look to 
the same kind of spectrum analysis used by the district court.79 
Finally, the D.C. Circuit turned to the third Boumediene factor—
practical obstacles—and concluded that this also “weigh[ed] 
overwhelmingly in favor” of the government’s position.80 The opinion 
enumerated two reasons why this is so. First, Afghanistan was an 
active theater of war.81 In fact, the court concluded that the situation 
in Afghanistan provided an even more compelling argument against 
habeas than the post-World War II Germany at issue in Eisentrager.82 
Second, Bagram is ultimately under Afghan sovereignty. This 
argument is problematic for a number of reasons, however. It is an 
attempt to shoehorn de jure sovereignty analysis—which was 
explicitly rejected as a determinative consideration by the 
Boumediene Court—into the third prong of Boumediene.83 It also 
mischaracterizes the district court’s opinion, arguing that the district 
court dismissed one petition because of Afghan sovereignty over 
Bagram.84 Of course, if that were true, then all of the petitions would 
have been dismissed, because all of the petitioners were held in the 
same location. 
Ultimately, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the petitioners did not 
have constitutional habeas rights and dismissed the petitions. The 
opinion leaves open one small door by noting that “manipulation by 
the Executive” designed to avoid judicial review of detentions might 
be an argument in favor of granting habeas in a later case.85 This, 
however, is the purest of dicta, and despite petitioners’ arguments that 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 97. 
 79. See supra Part III.A. 
 80. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 97. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 98. 
 83. See supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text; Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 762–
63 (2008) (“Nothing in Eisentrager says that de jure sovereignty is or has ever been the only 
relevant consideration in determining the geographic reach of the Constitution or of habeas 
corpus.”). 
 84. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 99. 
 85. Id. at 98–99. 
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such was the case here, the D.C. Circuit dismissed that concern.86 
The case ended there; a petition for panel rehearing was denied87 
and no petition for certiorari or rehearing en banc was ever filed. At 
least for now, the D.C. Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the 
Boumediene decision remains controlling law: persons held at Bagram 
Air Force Base do not have the constitutional right to habeas review. 
The court’s opinion stressed the practical difficulties with granting 
habeas, emphasizing that the petitioners were held in a war zone at a 
military base subject to the sovereignty of a foreign nation.88 
IV.  CIVIL RIGHTS AND THE USE OF GOVERNMENT POWER 
The writ of habeas corpus is a right89 of individuals.90 
Understanding which individuals should possess this right requires an 
analysis of the right’s nature and form. This part outlines a broad 
conception of the distinction between natural and civil rights before 
discussing the habeas right specifically and how it is designed to serve 
as a counterweight to executive authority. 
At the outset, it is worth reiterating what exactly the habeas writ 
does. In its most basic expression, a writ of habeas corpus ad 
subjiciendum is issued from the courts of law to an officer of the 
executive who has a particular person in his custody. The writ then 
requires the production of the detainee for review of the basis of 
 
 86. It is unclear whether this reasoning can be squared with the standard under which a 
motion to dismiss is evaluated—normally, factual questions are resolved against the moving 
party (e.g., here, in petitioners’ favor). See Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp., 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (“The complaint should not be dismissed unless plaintiffs can prove no set of 
facts in support of their claim which would entitle them to relief. To that end, the complaint is 
construed liberally in the plaintiffs’ favor, and we grant plaintiffs the benefit of all inferences 
that can be derived from the facts alleged.”). 
 87. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, No. 09-5625 (D.C. Cir. July 23, 2010) (per curiam) (order denying 
petition for rehearing). 
 88. There is some incongruity in the logic here, of course, in that normally there is very 
little respect for the sovereignty of a nation when it is on the opposing side of a military conflict. 
This, however, may reveal as much about the difficulties inherent in applying traditional notions 
of war and sovereignty to the fight against non-state terrorist actors. See Geoffrey S. Corn & 
Eric Talbot Jensen, Untying the Gordian Knot: A Proposal for Determining the Applicability of 
the Laws of War to the War on Terror, 81 TEMP. L. REV. 787, 796–803 (2008) (explaining why 
the current test determining the application of the laws of war is insufficient in light of the 
increasingly common conflicts between states and non-state organizations). 
 89. For the purposes of this discussion, the noun “right” is taken to mean a legal 
entitlement of persons. 
 90. See Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 99 (“[T]he jurisdiction of the courts to afford the right to 
habeas relief and the protection of the Suspension Clause does not extend to aliens held in 
Executive detention in the Bagram detention facility.” (emphasis added)). 
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detention.91 As such, the right to habeas inheres in the detained 
individual and, when exercised, compels state action. 
A. The Distinction between Natural and Civil Rights 
There are two elemental forms of rights: those that inhere in 
individuals regardless of the existence of civil society (natural rights) 
and those that are granted to individuals by a particular civil society 
(civil rights).92 
Natural rights arise from the ordinary interactions of persons. 
They include those rights generally asserted as foundational—such as 
the right to life, liberty, and property. Each of these is as capable of 
being asserted by one individual against another (“this land belongs 
to me and not to you”) as by an individual against the government 
(“this land belongs to me so you may not build a highway across it”). 
Further, there are rights elemental to human existence that require 
the imposition of force to infringe, such as the freedom of speech or of 
religion. These are similarly natural rights: the behavior protected by 
the right exists outside civil society, so enforcing the right involves 
restricting government power rather than enabling the individual.93 
Natural rights in civil society definitionally take the form of 
limitations on government power. The First Amendment’s guarantee 
that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech”94 is an acknowledgement that something called “the freedom 
of speech” is a preexisting faculty that must be protected from 
government interference. The form of the amendment, then, is 
evidence that what is being protected originated in the individual and 
exists outside the state: the right is defined as a restriction on 
congressional power to act.95 
 
 91. See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 131 
(1765). The following exemplifies the full, formal text of the writ: “We command you that the 
body of Charles L. Craig, in your custody detained, as it is said, together with the day and cause 
of his caption and detention, you safely have before Honorable Martin T. Manton, United 
States Circuit Judge for the Second Judicial Circuit, within the circuit and district aforesaid, to 
do and receive all and singular those things which the said judge shall then and there consider of 
him in this behalf; and have you then and there this writ.” Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255, 269 
(1923). 
 92. The description of these categories is not intended to convey any normative statement 
about the rights they do or do not contain, though examples will be given during the discussion. 
 93. See David S. Bogen, Slaughter-House Five: Views of the Case, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 333, 
339 (2003) (defining free speech as a “negative right[] against state interference”). 
 94. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 95. See id. (“Congress shall make no law . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
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This distinction is made sharper by comparison with the 
Constitution’s grants of positive rights, such as the right to counsel.96 
The Sixth Amendment does not prohibit Congress from taking away a 
person’s ability to have counsel present; rather, it provides individuals 
with a power against their government. If the government is going to 
prosecute, then the accused must be given the assistance of counsel.97 
This right is better understood as a civil right—it exists only within 
and because of the government action to which the individual is 
subject.98 
The specific rights-granting text is not the only relevant inquiry 
regarding the categorization of rights. A right is almost always a civil 
right when it requires reference to institutions of the government to 
be understood or realized. In the Sixth Amendment context, the right 
to counsel during a prosecution is only cognizable when there is an 
institutional apparatus of adversarial criminal justice in which the 
government is one of the opposing parties. Such a system does not 
exist in a vacuum: it is created by the state as a means of enforcing the 
criminal law. More importantly, it is specific to the particular state, 
unlike natural rights such as the freedom of speech. Though one can 
speak in any place, one cannot be subject to criminal prosecutions in 
the absence of a state with criminal law, nor have counsel in the 
absence of a system of legal representation.99 
B. The Proper Functioning of Civil Rights against Government 
Action 
Natural rights restrain government action and are the preferable 
vehicle by which a system of limited government can be constructed 
 
 96. Id. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” (emphasis added)). 
 97. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (applying the Sixth Amendment 
right to counsel to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 98. Asserting the right to counsel in the absence of government action (e.g., in civil cases) 
would only be possible via an expansion of a different provision, like the Fifth Amendment’s 
Due Process Clause. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or 
property without due process of law.”). The Supreme Court has suggested that this is not likely 
a valid conclusion. See Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 26–27 (1981) (adopting the 
presumption that the right to counsel does not inhere unless the proceedings may result in a 
deprivation of liberty); Julie M. Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil 
Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 659, 662 (1988) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that there is no 
absolute due process right to counsel in civil cases . . . .”). 
 99. This argument is not about the extent or type of right at issue: the freedom of speech 
may be broader or more restrictive in various countries. It is about the individual’s capacity to 
engage in the underlying action that the right protects (here, speech versus acquiring counsel). 
FORD 11.17.11 V.3 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2011  6:48 PM 
40 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE [VOL. 7 
and maintained. By contrast, civil rights apply to government actions 
that are lawful when done—but which have legal consequences. The 
right to counsel enshrined in the Sixth Amendment does not prevent 
the government from prosecuting individuals, but sets out a 
mechanism by which that use of state authority creates a 
countervailing power in the affected individuals. 
Civil rights, then, create in individuals an otherwise-inaccessible 
power that can be exercised against the government. They push back 
against government action by limiting the power of the state to act 
unilaterally and empowering those who are subject to state authority. 
Much like the right to due process enshrined in the Fifth 
Amendment,100 a civil right “gives a private right that authority shall 
go no farther.”101 These rights act to limit the power of the government 
by not only drawing a line but by establishing what the government 
cannot take away. 
Definitionally, civil rights are not available absent government 
action. No person has Sixth Amendment rights absent a criminal 
prosecution by the government;102 an attempt to demand counsel in a 
vacuum would be nonsensical. As discussed in the preceding section, 
civil rights are established by reference to institutions of the 
government, and so they inhere only when the government acts. But it 
is insufficient for the purposes of the present argument to establish 
that civil rights are responsive to government action against some; 
they must be shown to be responsive to government action against all. 
This task requires an understanding of why civil rights are granted 
in the first place and why it is important to constrain not only what 
powers the government may exercise (the function of natural rights), 
but also how the government may exercise the powers it is granted. 
Civil rights, unlike natural rights, do not circumscribe government 
power. The right to counsel does not create a substantive limitation on 
prosecutorial discretion;103 the right to receive just compensation in 
 
 100. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 101. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 102. See Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 954 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial 
of certiorari) (“A habeas corpus proceeding is, of course, civil rather than criminal in nature, 
and consequently the ordinary Sixth Amendment guarantee of compulsory process, which is 
made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, does not apply.” (footnotes 
omitted)). 
 103. The existence of a right to counsel does not limit a prosecutor’s ability to bring cases at 
will; indeed, if anything, the opposite is true. See David A. Barker, Environmental Crimes, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV. 1387, 1418 (2002) (“The 
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the event of a governmental taking104 does not limit what the 
government may take.105 These rights instead refer to the responsive 
powers of the person on whom the government acts: if your property 
is taken, you obtain a power to act against the government that took 
from you. This power exists regardless of whether the individual in 
fact takes action, because the individual’s right exists until waived. 
Though the Supreme Court has never considered the specific 
question of whether the right to just compensation may be waived,106 
it has certainly accepted the proposition that constitutional rights are 
subject to waiver.107 
The necessary consequence of the possibility of waiver is that the 
right inheres in the affected individuals for their knowing, voluntary, 
and intelligent use.108 The rules governing waiver are a tacit 
acknowledgement that the power of the individual stands outside the 
government action in question: the right presumptively inheres and 
must be waived to be deactivated.109 Those who seek to deny the 
application of a civil right should therefore have the obligation to 
demonstrate why it should not inhere. 
C. Rights without Borders: Normative and Contingent Arguments for 
the Extraterritorial Application of Civil Rights 
The larger question in Al Maqaleh is whether rights should have 
any application outside the sovereign territory of the nation that acts 
against the individual in question.110 The natural/civil rights dichotomy 
is instructive in answering this question to better reflect the 
underlying purposes of the right to habeas. 
 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for example, is undercut if most cases never see a courtroom 
due to the powers realized under broad grants of prosecutorial discretion.”). 
 104. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 105. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (holding that the Takings 
Clause may be used to transfer property from one private individual to another so long as there 
is a demonstrable “public use”). 
 106. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11–12, Carswell v. Dep’t of Land and Natural 
Res., 130 S. Ct. 2136 (2010) (No. 09–1153) (“This court has not directly confronted the question 
of what standard is required for a person to waive just compensation . . . .”). 
 107. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 400–01 (1993) (discussing the standard for waiver 
of the right to counsel). 
 108. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) (“Waivers of constitutional rights 
not only must be voluntary but must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness 
of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”). 
 109. See Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S. 408, 412 (1882) (noting that “every reasonable 
presumption should be indulged against” a finding of waiver). 
 110. See, e.g., Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 60 (2011) 
(discussing various approaches to the extraterritorial application of domestic rights). 
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Because natural rights underlie the system of constraints on 
government action, they are properly applicable only where the 
government has the authority to act: the sovereign territory of the 
nation. It would be patently absurd for United States citizens living 
abroad to bring lawsuits against a foreign government for violating 
their First Amendment rights. For an American court to hear such a 
claim would violate the centuries-old premise of state sovereignty.111 
By contrast, however, civil rights are responsive to government 
action and so should apply wherever the government acts. In Reid v. 
Covert,112 the Supreme Court held that when the United States 
“reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad,” the protections of the 
Bill of Rights still apply to that citizen.113 This conception of rights, 
though limited to citizens, views them as inherently responsive: 
although the Constitution does not apply in the foreign territory, 
those affected by the extraterritorial actions of the American 
government can still call upon the civil rights guaranteed by that 
government. This illustrates the importance of the distinction between 
action and inaction: some rights do not inhere absent government 
action, but do when the government “reaches out” to affect the life or 
liberty of an individual.114 But because Reid covers only those who 
were already American citizens, the question remains as to whether 
civil rights can apply to all persons affected by extraterritorial 
government action. 
This question must be answered in two ways: normatively and 
contingently. The normative argument is that civil rights should inhere 
in any person affected by government action, regardless of their 
status; the contingent argument is that it is consistent with 
contemporary jurisprudence that they do. 
The normative argument for the extraterritorial application of 
civil rights begins with the basic conception of these rights described 
above: they are grants of responsive power to individuals who are 
affected by government action. When these rights obtain is therefore 
a function of why they exist. As noted above,115 the primary purpose of 
creating civil rights cannot be to constrain government action—they 
 
 111. See Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 
2599, 2607 (1997) (discussing the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia and the resulting system of “state 
autonomy”). 
 112. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 113. Id. at 6. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See supra notes 100–102 and accompanying text. 
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do not exist until the government has already acted. This leaves two 
possibilities: either civil rights are another means by which 
government action is restricted—by the people themselves, post facto, 
rather than by a constitution—or they function as counterweights 
against the exercise of unchecked government authority. This 
distinction is fine-grained but important: it is the difference between 
making it illegal for the government to act versus creating 
consequences for a lawful government action. 
Unlike natural rights, it cannot be the case that civil rights make it 
unlawful for the government to act. Compare a restraint on the press 
with a detention. The former is presumptively unlawful, because the 
First Amendment has stripped away the government’s power to act in 
the first place.116 The latter, by contrast, is a lawful prerogative of the 
government—but is subject to certain consequences. Normatively, 
then, civil rights must be counterweights: they do not make it unlawful 
for the government to act; rather, they regulate and respond to 
permissible government action. 
The contingent argument requires the analysis of four “boxes” 
that result from the answers to two overarching questions: where the 
relevant action is taking place (sovereign territory versus abroad), and 
against whom the relevant action is taking place (a citizen versus a 
non-citizen). Extant case law provides the answer to three of these 
questions. First, civil rights unquestionably apply to citizens within the 
sovereign territory of the nation. Second, they apply to citizens who 
are abroad when the government “reaches out” to affect them.117 
Third, they apply to noncitizens present118 in the sovereign territory of 
the nation.119 With regard to the fourth box, where the case for the 
 
 116. U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.” (emphasis added)). 
 117. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 6 (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is 
abroad, the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect 
his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land.”). 
 118. The Supreme Court has interpreted the “presence” test in this context similarly to the 
test for “presence” with regard to the question of personal jurisdiction: the resident alien must 
have “come within the territory of the United States and developed substantial connections with 
this country.” United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990); cf. McGee v. Int’l 
Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (using a “substantial connection” test to establish 
personal jurisdiction of state courts over an out-of-state corporate defendant). As such, the test 
may be as much a question of the power of the court to exercise jurisdiction over an individual’s 
claim as it is about whether a particular right has inhered in that person. 
 119. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982) (holding that resident but illegal 
aliens are protected under the Equal Protection Clause); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 
590, 596 (1953) (holding that a resident alien is a “person” within the meaning of the Fifth 
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application of civil rights is arguably at its nadir, it was not until 
recently that the Supreme Court held that, under certain conditions, 
non-citizens may have constitutional rights while on foreign soil.120 
The Boumediene test for the extraterritorial application of 
constitutional rights121 is the Court’s most recent statement regarding 
this “fourth box.” A complete account of how contemporary 
jurisprudence protects the civil rights of foreign citizens who are 
affected by American government action abroad, therefore, requires a 
dissection of the Boumediene holding. 
D. Civil Rights and the Foreign National Living Abroad: The Reach 
of Boumediene 
The Boumediene holding extended the protection of the 
constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus to detainees held at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.122 To reach this conclusion, the Court defined 
a three-prong test to determine whether the Suspension Clause has 
effect with respect to a particular person in a particular site of 
detention: first, the detainee’s citizenship and status; second, the 
nature of the sites of apprehension and detention; and, third, the 
practical obstacles surrounding the entitlement to habeas.123 These 
prongs can be generalized to all civil rights: first, the citizenship of the 
affected person; second, the nature of their location when acted upon; 
finally, practical obstacles to recognizing the right in question. 
Boumediene, therefore, firmly established that constitutional rights—
at least the right to habeas—can obtain in a foreign national held 
outside the territory of the United States.124 
 
 
Amendment); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 148 (1945) (holding that resident aliens have First 
Amendment rights); Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (holding 
that the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment applies to resident aliens); Wong 
Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (holding that resident aliens are entitled to Fifth 
and Sixth Amendment rights); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (holding generally 
that resident aliens are protected under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 120. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (holding that detainees at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, have a constitutional right to the writ of habeas corpus and that 
denying them that right constitutes a violation of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution). 
 121. See supra Part II.A. 
 122. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 771 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the Constitution has full 
effect at Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now 
before us, Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”). 
 123. Id. at 766. 
 124. Id. at 771 (“If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied to the [non-citizen] 
detainees [held at Guantánamo] . . . Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of 
the Suspension Clause.”). 
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However laudable it may be to recognize the application of 
habeas as a counterweight against Executive detention, Boumediene 
does not go far enough. The central flaw in the holding of 
Boumediene is that it makes certain constitutional rights available 
only on the basis of flexible, easily manipulated preconditions. Yet 
rights are far too important and far too fundamental to appear or 
disappear based on “practical obstacles.”125 Indeed, as the Boumediene 
Court recognized, the Constitution has already enshrined in the 
Suspension Clause the means by which habeas rights may be 
limited.126 Although that clause recognizes the imperatives of 
exigency,127 it leaves it to the people’s representatives in Congress—
rather than the unelected Judiciary—to determine what exigencies 
justify suspending a basic right.128 
The flaw in Boumediene’s holding arose because the Court 
characterized the right to habeas as “an indispensable mechanism for 
monitoring the separation of powers.”129 This framing misses half the 
issue: though the suspension of the writ implicates the separation of 
powers, its application does not.130 Whether and how habeas is 
suspended involves an interplay between the Executive (as the 
detaining power), Congress (as the branch authorized to suspend the 
writ), and the Judiciary (which would hear the detainee’s petition). 
Yet whether the right to habeas obtains in an individual in the first 
place such that it could be suspended is a different question, one that 
does not implicate the separation of powers.131 Instead, it implicates 
the nature of the right itself—how far should the availability of 
 
 125. Id. at 765. 
 126. Id. at 745–46. 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (permitting suspension “when in Cases of Rebellion or 
Invasion the public Safety may require it”). 
 128. It is widely and commonly understood that the Suspension Clause is a limitation on the 
powers of Congress. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743–44, 771 (“That the Framers considered 
the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty is evident from the care taken 
to specify the limited grounds for its suspension.” (emphasis added)); see also RESOLUTION OF 
THE NEW YORK RATIFYING CONVENTION (July 26, 1788), in 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL 
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathan 
Elliot 2d ed. 1876) (noting the understanding that habeas rights obtain “except when, on 
account of public danger, the Congress shall suspend the privilege of the writ”). 
 129. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765. 
 130. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. 
Bush, 110 COLUM L. REV. 537, 548 (“The Boumediene majority attributed to the Suspension 
Clause a dual character: [i]t confers ‘rights’ on individuals, but also forms an element of the 
separation of powers.”). 
 131. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 798 (noting that habeas has been “a right of first importance” 
since the Framers’ era). 
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habeas extend? 
Habeas is a civil right: it protects detained individuals from the 
arbitrary use of force against their persons. It limits the Executive’s 
authority by pushing back on the use of that authority through the 
creation of a remedy in the form of a petition for release. Thus, the 
remedy inheres because there has been a detention, not because of 
the qualities of the person being detained or any obstacles inherent in 
remedying the detention. The right is created in response to the 
Executive’s action, and so should obtain wherever, and in whomever, 
the Executive chooses to detain. 
V.  REWRITING AL MAQALEH:  
TOWARD A NEW HABEAS PARADIGM 
The analysis in Part IV lays out a new conception of the habeas 
right that takes into account its fundamental character, rather than 
merely the jurisprudence that has evolved around particular cases or 
controversies. This Part turns to the question of how such a habeas 
writ would operate in practice by returning to Al Maqaleh. The 
American constitutional system does not permit the Executive to 
imprison an individual in time of war outside one of two systems of 
law: the constitutional guarantee of habeas or the Geneva 
Conventions’ standards for the treatment of prisoners of war.132 By 
failing to honor at least one of these, the Executive would be acting as 
a lawmaker in violation of the separation of powers.133 
A. The Prisoner-of-War Paradigm and the Habeas Paradigm 
The Third Geneva Convention established the customary 
international legal model for treatment of prisoners of war—those 
captured during hostilities involving a High Contracting Party to the 
Convention.134 Importantly, even when “one of the Powers in conflict 
may not be a party to the . . . Convention, the Powers who are parties 
thereto shall remain bound by it.”135 In its conflicts with al Qaeda and 
the governments of Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has 
entered into conflict with an actor not party to the Convention (al 
 
 132. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter “Third Geneva Convention”].  
 133. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . .”). 
 134. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 132, art. 2. 
 135. Id. 
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Qaeda) and two states party to the Convention.136 Thus, the 
Convention’s prisoner-of-war paradigm should govern the treatment 
of those captured by the United States during those conflicts.137 
This position, however, was resoundingly rejected by the second 
Bush Administration.138 In place of the Geneva Conventions, the 
government instituted military commissions to supervise the 
detention of captured enemy combatants.139 Since the decision in 
Boumediene, however, individuals captured and held by the United 
States—at least those at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba—have had access to 
the constitutionally guaranteed writ of habeas corpus to challenge 
their detention.140 The habeas paradigm, therefore, must be the 
starting point for any analysis of the rights of enemy combatants held 
overseas by the U.S. armed forces. Use of the Convention’s prisoner-
of-war paradigm would have obviated the need for habeas protection 
because it exists under an alternative body of law that regulates the 
appropriate length and conditions of detention.141 Absent the 
protections of the Geneva Conventions, however, the habeas writ is 
the constitutionally sanctioned alternative to an unacceptable legal 
vacuum. 
B. Restoring Full Habeas Protection to Detainees 
Given the analysis in Part IV, the full protections of habeas corpus 
should not be denied to any person detained by the U.S. government, 
 
 136. Afghanistan acceded to the Geneva Conventions on September 26, 1956; Iraq acceded 
on February 14, 1956. The United States acceded on August 2, 1955. International Humanitarian 
Law—State Parties/Signatories, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/We 
bSign?ReadForm&id=375&ps=P (last updated 2005). 
 137. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 132, art. 2. The War Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 
2441 (West 2006), directly incorporates the four Geneva Conventions, including the Third 
Convention (governing treatment of prisoners of war), into U.S. law. 
 138. The infamous “Yoo Memorandum” provided the most forceful denunciation of the 
position that the Geneva Conventions apply to the conflict in Afghanistan. See Memorandum 
from Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen. John Yoo and Special Counsel Robert J. Delahunty, Dep’t of 
Justice, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel to Dep’t of Def. (Jan. 9, 2002), available at 
http://lawofwar.org/Yoo_Delahunty_Memo.htm. But see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 44 
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (Williams, J., concurring) (“I believe the Convention’s language and structure 
compel the view that Common Article 3 [of the Geneva Conventions] covers the conflict with al 
Qaeda.”). 
 139. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 568–69 (2006). 
 140. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of the 
Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay. If the privilege of habeas corpus is to be denied 
to the detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the requirements of the 
Suspension Clause.”). 
 141. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 132, art. 4 (defining who can be a prisoner of 
war); see generally id. part II (defining the protections accorded prisoners of war). 
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regardless of their citizenship or the site of detention. The D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion in Al Maqaleh v. Gates,142 though in many ways a 
careful parsing of the test from Boumediene, was limited by the 
Boumediene Court’s own diluted approach to habeas—especially its 
ill-advised reliance on a “practical obstacles” exception to the 
application of constitutionally guaranteed rights.143 Both opinions fail 
to appreciate how the habeas writ operates to protect those who have 
been subjected to government action, rather than only those who 
happen to be well situated to bring a claim for relief. Access to the 
habeas writ should inhere automatically whenever any individual is 
subject to government detention.144 The Constitution recognizes only a 
limited mechanism by which habeas may be suspended,145 but the 
holding in Boumediene opens the door to a judicial suspension of 
habeas—which effectively occurred in Al Maqaleh. That judicial 
suspension is as unconstitutional as the suspension via military 
tribunals that was invalidated in Boumediene. The habeas writ is one 
of the foundational protections of liberty against government 
overreach—its application should not depend on the outcome of a 
three-prong test. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
This article has sought to lay out a framework for understanding 
the nature of rights in a constitutional democracy. It recognizes that 
not all rights are created equal because not all rights are created in 
the same way. Some arise naturally, out of the fact of citizenship and 
the powers inherent in a human being’s existence in society. The right 
to freedom of speech, for example, is a limitation on government 
power because the individual’s ability to speak precedes the existence 
of the government. Other rights are created in response to the powers 
granted to the government. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
for example, obtains when the government chooses to begin a 
criminal prosecution146 and does not apply in the absence of 
government action. Thus, the right it enshrines does not serve as a 
limitation on government power (prosecutorial discretion survives 
intact), but as a means of empowering those against whom the 
 
 142. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 143. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766. 
 144. See supra Part IV.B. 
 145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
 146. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398 (1977) (“[A] person is entitled to the help of a 
lawyer at or after the time that judicial proceedings have been initiated against him.”). 
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government acts. 
The right to the writ of habeas corpus should be understood as a 
means by which those who are subject to the will of the Executive are 
granted the power to contest the government’s actions. It is a 
counterweight against government action, not a limitation on when 
the government may act. As such, it should inhere on the basis of the 
use of Executive authority—wherever and against whomever the 
Executive chooses to act. To hold otherwise—as the Supreme Court 
did in Boumediene, by creating a judicially defined limitation on its 
own reading of constitutional rights—is to create a vacuum in which 
Executive action may deprive individuals of their liberty, and possibly 
even their life, without a corresponding legal remedy. Such an 
understanding of rights runs counter to one of the cornerstones of the 
American system of government: that no person shall be deprived of 
life or liberty without due process of law.147 
 
 
 147. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
